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ABSTRACT 
 
This article revisits the emergence of stop and frisk law in the 1960s to 
make three points.  One, the impetus for formalizing police stops arose 
midst confusion generated by Mapp v. Ohio, the landmark Warren Court 
opinion incorporating the exclusionary rule to the states.  Two, police 
over-reactions to Mapp intersected with fears of urban riots, leading to a 
formalization of stop and frisk rules that aimed at better containing inner-
city minority populations.  Three, the heightened control of urban streets 
coupled with the heightened protection of the private home bore 
geographic implications, interiorizing liberty in ways that perpetuated a 
national narrative of expanding freedoms even as it contributed to black 
incarceration.  
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“TO CORRAL AND CONTROL”: 
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ANDERS WALKER

 
 
 
Behind police brutality there is social brutality, economic brutality, and 
political brutality. 
 
– Eldridge Cleaver1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 Few issues in American criminal justice have proven more toxic to 
police/community relations than stop and frisk.  To take just one example, 
federal judge Shira Scheindlin recently declared that stops lacking 
“individualized reasonable suspicion” had become so “pervasive and 
persistent” in New York City that they not only reflected “standard 
[police] procedure,” but had become “a fact of daily life” for minority 
residents.
2
  Scheindlin promptly ordered “immediate changes to the 
NYPD’s policies,” meanwhile recalling the Supreme Court’s observation 
in Terry v. Ohio that “the degree of community resentment” caused by a 
particular police practice could influence judicial “assessment” of that 
practice.
3
 
 Scheindlin’s invocation of Terry as a curb on stop and frisk proved 
remarkable.  According to most accounts, Terry marked a turning point in 
the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure revolution, a move away from 
extending constitutional rights to minorities and towards granting 
increased discretion to police, through the sanctioning of stop and frisk.
4
  
                                                 

 Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; PhD Yale University 2003, JD Duke 
University 1998, BA Wesleyan University 1994.  I would like to thank Tracey Meares, 
David Sklansky, Jeffrey Fagan, Devon Carbado, Darryl K. Brown, Kami Chavis 
Simmons, Scott Sundby, Arnold Loewy, Eric J. Miller, and Joel Goldstein for input on 
this piece.  I would also like to thank Adina Schwartz, Dorothy Schultz, and the members 
of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice faculty for early conversations on this topic, 
including insight into the role that riots played in the development of a Humanities 
curriculum for the New York City Police Department. 
1
 ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 133 (1968). 
2
 David Floyd, et al, v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (S. D. N. Y. filed August 12, 
2013).   
3
 David Floyd, et al, v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (S. D. N. Y. filed August 12, 
2013), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 14 n.11 (1968). 
4
 Tracey Meares, The Warren Court Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a 
Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106 (2005) (describing the Warren Court’s 
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Yet, Scheindlin’s point evokes a different history, one that played out 
almost half a century ago on the streets of New York.  At that time, Terry 
did not betray the Warren Court’s revolution so much as compensate for 
tensions exacerbated by it, particularly issues triggered by Mapp v. Ohio; 
the landmark 1961 opinion extending the exclusionary rule to the states.
5
  
Praised for requiring that police procure detailed warrants before entering 
private homes, Mapp actually worsened interactions between police and 
minorities on the street, in part by encouraging police to develop creative 
means of stopping suspects; including techniques that involved 
intimidation and violence.
6
  As news of such methods began to spread, the 
NYPD itself began to lobby for more formalized stop and frisk 
requirements, hoping to reduce the likelihood of police/minority conflict.
7
  
The Supreme Court’s eventual approval of such requirements in Terry v. 
Ohio and a companion case styled Sibron v. New York, marked a 
standardization of police procedure that appeared to facilitate local 
policing, even as it bore larger, geographic implications.
8
  No longer free 
                                                                                                                                                 
criminal procedure cases as “a branch of ‘race law’” that aimed to ameliorate racial 
inequality); Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and 
the Equality Principle 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that an interest in 
equality animated the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution); CHARLES 
WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5
th
 ed. 2008) (noting that the Court’s procedure rulings were 
partly “triggered by the Supreme Court’s growing appreciation of the position occupied 
by the ‘underprivileged’ of society – minority groups, the poor, and the young”); Arnold 
H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1 (2010). 
5
  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
6
 See infra §II. The argument made here is different from Darryl K. Brown’s claim that 
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings “prompted widespread opposition that 
took the form of political debate and reform efforts.”  Darryl K. Brown, The Warren 
Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1411, 1416 (2002).  While Brown is correct, this article posits that the Court’s 
criminal procedure rulings also served to obscure urban inequalities, long before 
engendering a conservative, legislative backlash.  Also, the backlash that did ensue in 
New York aimed not to undue the Warren Court’s decisions so much as to limit the 
negative effect that Mapp v. Ohio had on street altercations between urban minorities and 
police.  For an argument similar to Brown’s, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997); 
CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5
th
 ed. 2008) (noting that the Court’s procedure 
rulings were partly “triggered by the Supreme Court’s growing appreciation of the 
position occupied by the ‘underprivileged’ of society – minority groups, the poor, and the 
young”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2010).  
7
 See infra §III.  
8
 The argument that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions were ultimately a 
theatrical move to reduce police/minority tensions does not contradict the claim, made by 
Devon Carbado, that police/minority interactions constitute “racial theater.”  See, e.g. 
Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953 (2002).  
On the contrary, this piece argues the Warren Court became very interested in improving 
  4 
to enter homes without warrants, police in New York intensified their 
focus on public spaces, pushing liberty indoors and setting the stage for 
the increased surveillance of the public sphere, a move that facilitated the 
apprehension and incarceration of black men.
9
  
 While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that 
stop and frisks “often serve as the gateway into the criminal justice 
system” for “young men of color,” she occludes the complex forces that 
led to their rise.
10
  This Article seeks to identify those forces, relating the 
rise of stop and frisk rules to liberal politics, Cold War concerns, and 
spatial dynamics.  To illustrate, this article will proceed in three parts.  
Part I will demonstrate how Mapp v. Ohio coincided with judicial 
frustration at police intrusions into private, intimate space – including 
private thought – precisely at a time when the United States sought to 
distinguish itself from totalitarian “thought control” regimes during the 
Cold War.  Part II will show how the Court’s effort to prevent thought 
control and guard intimate space in Mapp engendered an unanticipated 
public effect, leading police both to lie about arrests and to use more 
violent means for procuring evidence from suspects on the street.
11
  
Finally, Part III will show how such street-level tensions played out at the 
local and national levels, interiorizing liberty in ways that allowed for a 
narrative of expanding freedoms midst a climate of increased police 
control.
12
 
Though scholars tend to cite 1968 as a turning point in Warren 
Court jurisprudence, a moment when liberal impulses on the Court 
succumbed to a conservative “counter-revolution,” this article suggests a 
more fractured narrative – one in which liberal and conservative justices 
alike tolerated expansions of domestic liberty but moved increasingly, 
inadvertently, to heightening regulations of urban landscapes.
13
  Here, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the theatrical quality of such interactions, partly to reduce the likelihood that bystanders 
would react negatively to police searches and arrests.   
9
 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS, 134-137 (2010) 
10
 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS, 136 (2010).  
11
 Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan 
Police Practices 1960-1962, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 555-60 (1968).  
12
 While Michelle Alexander focuses heavily on conservative backlash politics, this 
Article places responsibility at the feet of liberal reformers as well.  See, e.g. MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS, 136 (2010).  
13
  For the “counter-revolution” metaphor, see PRISCILLA H. MACHADO ZOTTI, INJUSTICE 
FOR ALL: MAPP VS. OHIO AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 170 (2005).  See also Yale 
Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 
TULSA L. J. 1, 2-3 (1995); LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 407-411 (2000); Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth 
Amendment 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603 (2007); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial 
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982); Devon W. Carbado, 
(E)racing the Fourth Amendment 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); William J. Stuntz, The 
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1288 (1999); 
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concerns over state infringement on personal privacy in the 1950s help 
explain the Court’s interest in expanding liberty in private, intimate 
settings, meanwhile moving quickly to contain direct action protest and 
violence in public spaces.
14
  Over time, the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure revolution assumed a geographic dimension, pushing liberty 
into discrete spaces that posed little threat of violent crime, political 
disorder or riots.
15
 
 That the Court interiorized liberty in the 1960s is a point that 
scholars have only hinted at.
16
  For example, criminal procedure scholars 
David Sklansky and Jeannie Suk have both raised the intimacy dimensions 
of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence.
17
  To 
Sklansky, the Court’s concern with the Fourth Amendment stemmed in 
part from an interest in thwarting police harassment of gay men.
18
  For 
Suk, the Court’s interest in the Fourth Amendment coincided with a larger 
interest in protecting intimate space, particularly the home – a place where 
“woman,” as the Court put it in 1961, “is still regarded as the center of 
                                                                                                                                                 
A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 
(1968); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 192 (2
nd
 ed., 1998); Dan M. Kahan & Tracy Meares, The Coming Crisis of 
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.L.J. 1153, 1156-59 (1998).  For a related reading of the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, see Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s 
Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that 
the Warren Court did not extend rights to criminal defendants so much as insist on “inter-
branch regulation” of police/defendant interaction.  To Miller, the Court pursued a 
“republican” approach to criminal justice regulation.  This article posits a more ad hoc 
approach: first an expansion of liberty in intimate spaces and then a move towards 
containing blacks in urban ghettos); Fabio Arcila, Suspicion and the Protection of Fourth 
Amendment Values, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 237 (arguing that Fourth Amendment values 
include not simply aiding minorities but “limiting governmental discretion, protecting 
privacy and dignitary interests, minimizing intrusiveness, and assuring a compelling and 
legitimate governmental need for a search”).  
14
 ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR 
ERA 133-34 (1988). 
15
 The argument in this piece tracks criminal law scholar Bernard Harcourt’s  effort to 
“expose the real stakes” in the debate over police searches, arguing that improved police 
procedure plays a critical role in the maintenance of structural inequality.  Bernard 
Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 
CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 363, 365 (2004).  
16
 David Alan Sklansky,“One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret 
Subtext of Criminal Procedure,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008); Jeannie Suk, Is 
Privacy a Woman? 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 490 (2009). 
17
 David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret 
Subtext of Criminal Procedure,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008); Jeannie Suk, Is 
Privacy a Woman? 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 490 (2009). 
18
 Sklansky suggests that the Court’s interest in restricting state eavesdropping on phone 
lines stemmed from a spatial concern  over state surveillance of intimate relations 
between gay men in toilet stalls.  See David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide 
Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure,” 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008).  
  6 
home and family life.”19  Both scholars characterize the Court’s concern 
for regulating police in terms that evoke intimate relationships, either 
between same sex couples or couples of the opposite sex, pairs that bear 
little in common with isolated individuals on the street.   
 Building on Suk and Sklansky, this article posits that the Court’s 
interest in curtailing police stemmed less from an interest in ameliorating 
substantive inequality than expanding the scope of freedom in politically 
neutral, private spaces.  Though remembered as a bid to help the poor, in 
other words, many of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions 
actually did little to help the less affluent.
20
 Black activists in New York 
argued precisely this point in the 1960s, questioning the Court’s concern 
for the poor and agreeing with police that law enforcement’s function vis a 
vis minorities had shifted from “[c]rime prevention” to “peace-keeping” a 
role aimed primarily at controlling urban landscapes.
21
  According to 
black writer James Baldwin, the Court’s campaign to soften police 
procedure sought primarily to contain black urban populations; or as he 
put it to “corral and control the ghetto.”22  In fact, from 1961 to 1968, New 
York City police and radical black leaders alike complained that the city 
was heightening the risk of urban violence by focusing on 
procedural/privacy matters, meanwhile ignoring structural causes of 
poverty and inequality.
23
  Rather than level the playing field between rich 
and poor, in other words, the Warren Court’s procedure rulings struck 
black activists and New York City cops alike as a type of theatre aimed at 
preserving inequality by holstering the truncheon, improving the 
management of the poor rather than fixing underlying socio-economic 
problems plaguing urban communities.
24
 
                                                 
19
 Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman? 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 509 (2009) citing Hoyt v. Florida, 
368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).  Suk shows how feminists challenged gendered tropes of privacy 
in the late twentieth century in JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009).  
20
 CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5
th
 ed. 2008) (noting that the Court’s procedure 
rulings were partly “triggered by the Supreme Court’s growing appreciation of the 
position occupied by the ‘underprivileged’ of society – minority groups, the poor, and the 
young”). 
21
 In June 1969, CUNY Sociology professor and former NYPD officer Arthur 
Niederhoffer posited that police had suddenly taken on two very different roles, “[c]rime 
prevention” and “peace-keeping” both of which were “antithetical.” The Changing City: 
Crime on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1969, 35. 
22
 James Baldwin, James Baldwin on the Harlem Riots, N.Y. POST, August 2, 1964, 3. 
23
 For works documenting police/Panther violence, see PAUL ALKEBULAN, SURVIVAL 
PENDING REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 200-233 (2007); 
CURTIS J. AUSTIN, UP AGAINST THE WALL: VIOLENCE AND THE MAKING AND UNMAKING 
OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (2006); WILLIAM L VAN DEBURG, NEW DAY IN 
BABYLON: THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965-1975 (1992).  
24
 Id.  The use of theatre described in this piece aimed to obscure larger inequalities in 
American society, not to act as “a morality play for those involved in the nitty gritty of 
law enforcement,” as Scott Sundby argues in Mapp v. Ohio’s Unsung Hero: The 
Suppression Hearing as Morality Play 85 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 255, 257 (2010).  
  7 
 That criminal procedure served a theatrical function in the 1960s 
coincides with the argument made by criminologist Peter K. Manning that 
much of modern policing hinges on image management, on maintaining 
“public support” for police by curtailing violence and engaging in a larger 
“drama of control.”25  According to Manning, this drama became 
particularly important in the United States as “the rise of large minority 
populations in urban areas and their exclusion from many opportunities 
changed the problems of urban social integration and crime into the more 
serious issue of politically managing a rising underclass demanding wider 
access to all forms of community service.”26  Though Manning focuses his 
inquiry on the rise of community policing in the 1980s, his analytic can be 
extended further, to the 1960s, and extended to include the federal 
judiciary.
27
  During that time, this article posits, the drama of control 
became crucial not only to local police but also to the  Supreme Court, 
who – as we shall see – moved aggressively to improve the image of urban 
police even as it constrained the protest powers of urban minorities, all 
part of a larger move to facilitate “managing a rising underclass.”28   
 
I. THOUGHT CONTROL 
 
 Though oft-considered an opening salvo in the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure revolution, Mapp v. Ohio began its constitutional 
journey as a dispute over dirty books.
29
  Suspected of harboring a person 
involved in a local bombing, Dollree Mapp confronted police at her 
Cleveland home on May 23, 1957, seized a document that they proclaimed 
to be a warrant, and stuffed it in her shirt.
30
  After a tussle, police 
recovered the paper and proceeded to search Mapp’s house, ultimately 
discovering four books: London Stage Affairs, Affairs of a Troubador, 
Memoirs of a Hotel Man, and Little Darlings, together with “a nude pencil 
                                                 
25
 Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 28 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 
1991).  
26
 Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 27 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 
1991).  
27
 Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 27 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 
1991). 
28
 Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 27 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 
1991).  Bernard Harcourt has identified a similar irony in the imposition of curfew laws 
in urban parks, noting how the enforcement of such laws curtail political demonstrations 
but do little to silence corporate speech in the form of public advertisements.  See 
Bernard Harcourt, The Occupy Chicago Arrests: Rahm Emanuel’s ‘dry run’ for G8 and 
Nato? guardian.co.uk, Feb. 15, 2012.  
29
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
30
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961) 
  8 
sketch,” and “several photos found in a suitcase.”31 Convinced that the 
items were obscene, police arrested her for “possession of obscene 
pictures and books.”32 
 Though Mapp’s attorneys fought to exclude the evidence at trial, 
they abandoned that position on appeal, arguing instead that Ohio’s 
obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague and that Mapp’s arrest was 
so outrageous as to warrant an acquittal.
33
  The latter argument followed 
Rochin v. California, a 1952 Supreme Court case chastising police for 
ordering a defendant’s stomach pumped to retrieve heroine, something the 
Court found so egregious that it not only “shocked the conscience,” but 
violated the Constitution.
34
  Just as unconstitutional, argued Mapp’s legal 
counsel, was Ohio’s obscenity law, a relatively recent measure that 
expanded criminal liability from manufacturers and sellers of pornography 
to private citizens.
35
  On this point, Mapp received support from the Ohio 
Civil Liberties Union, or OCLU, who argued that the law was not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, failed to adequately define 
obscenity, and invaded the “private rights” of individuals.36 Such rights, 
argued the OCLU, stemmed from the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments – a type of emanation argument that prefigured Griswold v. 
Connecticut.
37
  Also, the OCLU’s First Amendment attack drew strength 
from a 1959 Supreme Court case, Smith v. California, holding that even 
though obscenity did not warrant constitutional protection, a state law 
prohibiting mere possession of obscene books by merchants violated the 
First Amendment.
38
   
 Though the First Amendment question failed to persuade a 
requisite majority of Ohio’s Supreme Court, it did capture the attention of 
the nation’s highest tribunal.39  In conferences and private discussions on 
the case, Justice Harlan argued persuasively that the core issue of the case 
was “thought control.”40  Others concurred.  In fact, the day after oral 
arguments in the case, all of the Justices “agreed” that the core concern in 
Mapp was the manner in which Ohio’s obscenity law amounted to a 
“thought control statute.”41   
 The Court’s identification of Ohio’s obscenity law as a thought 
control statute is worth noting.  The term first emerged in the 1920s when 
                                                 
31
 CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES & SEIZURES 8 (2006). 
32
 Id., at 13. 
33
 Id., at 25. 
34
 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
35
 CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES & SEIZURES 26 (2006). 
36
 Id., at 27. 
37
 Id., at  27. 
38
 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
39
 CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES & SEIZURES 63 (2006). 
40
 Id., at 82. 
41
 Id., at 82. 
  9 
word broke that the Japanese government was considering new statutory 
means of regulating dissent.
42
  Such stories became even more prevalent 
during World War II, when both Japan and Nazi Germany imposed strict 
regulations on public thought and speech.
43
  Following the war, many in 
the West suspected the Soviet Union of imposing thought control on its 
people, inspiring author George Orwell to pen an alarming critique of 
totalitarianism entitled 1984.
44
  Published in 1949, 1984 resonated with 
concerns that the Soviet Union had established within its borders a police 
state denying freedom of thought to its citizens.
45
   
Some Americans warned that such restraints were coming to the 
United States.  In 1949, Princeton University President Dodds argued that 
were it not for the nation’s sustained support of private institutions, 
particularly private schools, Americans might succumb to “a growing 
threat of Government ‘thought control.’”46  Five years later, Florida 
attorney John M. Coe accused the federal government of just that, 
declaring that the Internal Security Act put “the government in the 
thought-control business” by placing restraints on “speech, press, and 
assembly.”47 
 Enacted over a presidential veto in 1950, the Internal Security, or 
McCarran Act required that communists forgo employment in 
government, unions, and the defense industry, meanwhile registering with 
the Subversive Activities Control Board, a government agency formed to 
neutralize domestic communist threats.
48
  Though the Supreme Court 
declared the McCarran Act constitutional in 1951, it hardened its view in 
1955 as Senator Joseph McCarthy accused military officials of communist 
sympathies, compromising the credibility of anti-communists nationally.
49
  
In 1957, the Court overturned the convictions of fourteen defendants who 
allegedly belonged to the Communist Party, several Justices complaining 
that their conviction represented “a political trial” in violation of the First 
Amendment.
50
   
                                                 
42
 RICHARD H. MITCHELL, THOUGHT CONTROL IN PREWAR JAPAN 15-36 (1976). 
43
 Albion Ross, Goebbels Edits the Popular Mind in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
14, 1937, 123; Hugh Byas, Japan’s Censors Aspire to “Thought Control,” N.Y. 
TIMES, April 18, 1937, 128.   
44
 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).  
45
 Id.  
46
 Murray Illson, Dodds Finds Peril to Free Education: Princeton Head Warns 
of U.S. ‘Thought-Control’ in Talk at Washington & Lee Event, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 13, 1949, 30.  
47
 Suit Begun to Kill New Security Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1950, 6.  
48
 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 77 
(2000).  
49
 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 99 
(2000). 
50
 Del Dixon, ed., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 282 (2001).  
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 The Supreme Court referred repeatedly to thought control in the 
1950s, always as a distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian regimes.
51
  
In 1950, for example, the Court made a point of refuting a charge of 
thought control against §9(h) of the 1947 Labor Management Relations 
Act, requiring Labor union officers to file an affidavit stating that they 
were not communist.
52
  Similarly, in 1952, the Court rejected a charge that 
piping music into public streetcars constituted “thought control,” though 
Justice Douglas warned of it in a dissent.
53
  “[O]nce privacy is invaded,” 
he declared, “privacy is gone,” insinuating that even though playing 
government-sponsored music on streetcars might have been a harmless 
cultural program, “[i]t may be but a short step,” he prophesied, “from a 
cultural program to a political program.”54  Though a passing assertion in 
an arguably inconsequential dissent, Douglas’s mention of “political 
program[s]” in Public Utilities v. Pollak revealed the manner in which he 
viewed “the right of privacy” to be a “powerful deterrent to anyone who 
would control men’s minds.”55 
 Closely linked to the Court’s interest in “men’s minds” was a 
concomitant interest in restrictions on what private citizens could read.  
Evidence of this emerged not simply in thought control cases like Public 
Utilities v. Pollak and American Communications v. Douds, but obscenity 
cases like Butler v. Michigan, decided in 1957, where the Supreme Court 
struck down an Illinois statute enjoining “the publication or distribution of 
materials ‘manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.”56  
Though comfortable with the idea that states could control obscenity, the 
Court rejected the idea that standards set for children should govern 
adults.
57
  Four months later, the Court confronted the problem of obscenity 
again; this time in a case challenging the conviction of Samuel Roth, a 
bookseller convicted of publishing a magazine entitled American 
Aphrodite.
58
   Here, the Court cabined what could be considered obscene, 
exempting works of literature and art thought to have critical merit, aimed 
at more than simply “appealing to the prurient interest.”59   
 Ironically, even as the Court worked to liberalize restrictions on 
erotic literature, so too did Cold War conservatives link the cause of 
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sexual liberation to national weakness and communism.
60
  “[S]exual 
excesses or degeneracy,” notes historian Elaine Tyler May, were 
considered by conservatives in the 1950s to make “individuals easy prey 
for communist tactics.”61  Consequently, the FBI “mounted an all-out 
effort to discover the personal sexual habits of those under suspicion of 
subversive behavior,” with a particular emphasis on “homosexuals.”62 
According to Nebraska Senator Kenneth Wherry, it was impossible to 
“separate homosexuals from subversives,” a sentiment that led to an 
“obsession” with rooting out gays in government.63  Also targeted were 
heterosexual officials living outside the “maturity” and “responsibility” of 
marriage, sparking a bizarrely Puritanical crusade to regulate both sexual 
proclivities and private thought.
64
 
 Notions that sexual deviance threatened national security cut 
against the Supreme Court’s tendency towards liberalizing erotic literature 
and freeing “men’s minds,” perhaps explaining why the Court avoided 
striking down Ohio’s obscenity law in Mapp, preferring instead the less 
salacious path of invoking the exclusionary rule against the states.
65
 
Though Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker balked when Clark 
mentioned the exclusionary rule, an issue that Mapp’s attorneys had not 
briefed, the impulse to sidestep sex and overturn Wolf v. Colorado may 
simply have been an effort to “hide” one train behind another, as privacy 
scholar David Sklansky argues the Court did six years later in Katz v. 
United States, again a case involving police and sex.
66
  Indeed, Sklansky’s 
observation that the Court sought to hide protections for gay men 
subjected to police surveillance in the rhetoric of Fourth Amendment 
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privacy may itself have stemmed from judicial frustration with histrionic 
Cold War claims that homosexuals threatened national security.
67
 
Even if the Court was not responding to Cold War sexual paranoia, 
the majority opinion in Mapp nevertheless framed the extension of the 
exclusionary rule to the states in decidedly intimate terms.  According to 
Justice Clark, the police in question did not simply arrest Dollree Mapp 
for possessing pornographic literature; they “broke” into her home and 
proceeded to run “roughshod” over her.68  In terms evoking sexual assault 
and even rape, Justice Clark recounted how one officer retrieved a sheet of 
paper from Mapp’s “bosom,” “grabbed her,” “twisted her hand,” and 
“forcibly” took her “upstairs to the bedroom,” as she “yelled [and] pleaded 
with him” that “it was hurting.”69  Though the pornographic literature in 
question was ultimately found in the basement, Justice Clark focused his 
resuscitation of facts on the bedroom, noting how police searched “a 
dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases,” even perusing “a 
photo album” belonging to the defendant.70 
According to criminal law scholar Jeannie Suk, judicial 
articulations of privacy in gendered terms – as attacks on the privacy of 
women – reflected a larger “anxiety” suffered by men “about intrusion” 
into male dominated private space.
71
  This anxiety, argues Suk, stemmed 
in part from the traditional “nineteenth century bourgeois ideal” of the 
home as a man’s castle – a place where a man’s property, including his 
spouse, was protected from other men.
72
  This anxiety also stemmed from 
a concern that men be free from “state intrusion” in matters sexual, 
including the right to “look at images of sex and naked women,” a right 
the Court actually came to recognize in Stanley v. Georgia in 1969.
73
  
Though Mapp predated Stanley by eight years, the gendered tone of 
Clark’s opinion, coupled with the pornography laden facts at issue in 
Mapp, suggest that preserving porn may in fact have been one of the 
inspirations for suddenly invoking the exclusionary rule; making it an 
early defense to sexual “thought control.”74  
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 Another, more commonly cited inspiration for the Mapp ruling was 
race, a point made by criminal procedure scholars like Tracey Meares and 
Thomas Davies.
75
  According to Davies, the “racist police abuse” in Mapp 
together with a prior decision styled Monroe v. Pape, “may have 
convinced Justice Clark that it was past time to extend federal supervision 
to state criminal justice.”76 Yet, the precise manner in which Mapp aided 
racial minorities is not clear.
77
  In fact, as the next section will show, 
initial signs that police procedure improved in the wake of Mapp quickly 
gave way to reports that the decision was pushing police to new levels of 
corruption in New York City, both in terms of how they procured 
evidence and how they treated minorities on the street.
78
  If Mapp’s genius 
was its ability to mask sexual prurience in the theatre of domestic privacy, 
then its downfall would be what Devon Carbado calls the “racial theater” 
of the street.
79
 
 
II. “SUBSTANCE NOT SHADOW” 
 
 Decided on June 19, 1961, Mapp appeared to have an immediately 
positive impact on police.
80
 According to Richard Kuh, Secretary of the 
New York State District Attorney’s Association, police did in fact become 
more serious about acquiring warrants before conducting searches of 
private homes following the ruling.
81
  Prior to Mapp, claimed Kuh, 
officers rarely requested a warrant before searching an individual’s private 
“apartment, home, flat, [or] loft.”82  “All this has changed,” he argued in 
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September of 1962, one year after the opinion was handed down, 
tendencies towards ignoring warrant requirements “changed overnight.”83 
 Yet, Mapp triggered unanticipated effects as well.  Over a twelve 
month period, for example, arrests for illegal lottery or “policy” violations 
dropped thirty-five percent in New York City.
84
  During that same time 
period, convictions for “narcotics misdemeanor offenses” dropped forty 
percent.
85
  Similar drops could be found for “contraband – possession of 
weapons, [and] obscene prints.”86  Such declines, maintained Kuh, 
stemmed from the fact that officers felt uncertain as to whether they could 
lawfully search suspects who were not officially under arrest.
87
 
 Even as arrests dropped, a more troubling phenomenon also 
emerged: police corruption appeared to increase.  According to Kuh, 
during the year immediately following Mapp, police testimony became 
increasingly “improbable” as officers began to testify that upon seeing 
police, suspects simply “removed” objects from their pockets, “threw” 
them to the ground, and obviated the need for a search.
88
  Similarly, police 
assigned to search private homes began to testify more frequently that they 
had been “invited” to search the homes of defendants, again precluding the 
need for a warrant.
89
  Not only did Mapp reduce arrests, in other words, 
but it also encouraged police to stretch the truth, telling more elaborate 
“stories” to bolster the arrests they did make.90 
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 In a study of almost 4,000 arrests, New York Legal Services 
corroborated Kuh’s suspicions, providing hard data that police arrest 
narratives changed significantly in the aftermath of the ruling.
91
  For 
example, claims that suspects mysteriously “dropped” contraband upon 
sight of police rose significantly after the decision, particularly among 
uniformed officers who reported a 71.8 percent spike in such “dropsies” 
during the year immediately following Mapp.
92
  Meanwhile, reports that 
police found contraband “hidden on the person” of suspects declined 
significantly at precisely the same time, indicating that police were 
suddenly cautious about admitting to searches.
93
   
 An officer provided a clue into the brave new world of evidence 
recovery post-Mapp during an illegal search trial in New York City on 
September 12, 1962.
94
  Charged with unlawfully searching a suspect, the 
officer claimed that he “frisked” suspects but did not conduct actual 
searches of them.
95
  Pressed by a judge, the officer then demonstrated a 
standard frisk before the court, a relatively violent maneuver that aimed to 
shake evidence to the ground.
96
  Rather than simply pat down the outside 
of the suspect’s clothing, for example, the patrolman “grabbed” the 
suspect “and practically lifted him off his feet”; meanwhile shaking him to 
loosen any items that might be secreted in his pockets, waistband, or 
belt.
97
  As a cigarette lighter and pair of eyeglasses “fell” to the floor, the 
manner in which a frisk might generate a drop suddenly became apparent, 
leaving open the question whether Mapp’s prohibition on searches also 
applied to frisks, even forceful ones like the one demonstrated by the 
officer.
98
 
 Even if officers decided against frisks, other means of procuring 
evidence from suspects on the street emerged post-Mapp.
99
  In Cincinnati, 
for example, patrolmen “rush[ed]” suspects, “hoping to produce a panic” 
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that would then lead them to “visibly discard” evidence.100  Here too, the 
Court’s application of the exclusionary rule had a counterintuitive effect; 
increasing the likelihood that police would engage in menacing behavior 
to get suspects to drop evidence.
101
 
 Police efforts to induce dropped evidence indicate that rather than 
improve police conduct, Mapp may have only intensified the use of force, 
lying, and deception, pressing police to misrepresent how, precisely, they 
acquired evidence.
102
  Of course, most dropsy cases did not involve the 
search of private homes, hence Mapp’s success at garnering greater 
warrant requests.  However, even Mapp’s warrant data raised questions 
about the decision’s ultimate effects.  For example, New York Legal 
Services concluded that although police requested more warrants to search 
private rooms following Mapp, the actual location of arrests generally 
seemed to migrate out of private rooms and into public spaces following 
the decision.  To illustrate, the location of most arrests prior to Mapp were 
streets (35%) and “unexplained rooms” (26%) meaning “rooms entered 
without explanation by the police.”103  Following the ruling, police 
reported lower numbers of arrests in unexplained rooms, dropping them 
from 26% to 17.6%, meanwhile increasing arrests in “hallways,” “roof 
landings,” and “basements.”104 
 What did this mean?  Just as Mapp may have pressured officers to 
acquire warrants before entering homes, so too may the decision have 
refocused police attention on public space.
105
  Rather than improve police 
professionalism, in other words, the decision simply transported police 
corruption, removing it from private homes to public areas (streets, 
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hallways, roof landings, and basements), where police could then shake 
down suspects for evidence.
106
  This seemed a reasonable conclusion to 
New York Legal Services, who surmised that officers may have “stopped 
entering private rooms” and turned instead to spending “more time in the 
streets and halls.”107  Rather than “level the playing field” between rich 
and poor, in other words, Mapp simply provided more privacy to the 
already well-off, particularly those wealthy enough to live behind closed 
doors – either in spacious suburban homes or door-manned buildings – 
where police were unlikely to prowl.
108
  Conversely, poor residents of 
cramped apartments and public housing projects – the very people most in 
need of public space – suddenly found themselves the targets of 
intensified police searches, albeit in their halls, landings, and 
basements.
109
  
 To what extent, if any, did the Supreme Court anticipate such an 
outcome? Rather than predict police corruption, the Court seemed 
convinced that Mapp would diminish it.  “If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker,” lectured the majority opinion, “it breeds contempt for the 
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.”110  Rather than breed anarchy, the Court seemed to think it was 
restoring public confidence by reforming police behavior.  “[N]othing can 
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own 
laws,” the Court concluded, implying that Mapp would ultimately pressure 
law enforcement to heightened, not lowered, lawfulness.
111
 
 Not everyone agreed.  Only a few months after Mapp was handed 
down, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission declared that better methods of 
improving police conduct existed than “those which provide sanctions 
after the fact,” like the exclusionary rule.112  To the Commission’s mind, 
“preventive” measures promised to be more effective at regulating police 
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misconduct, including measures aimed at the “application of professional 
standards to the selection and training of policemen.”113  Such standards 
worked for “Federal police agents,” asserted the report, and could be 
further augmented by “good pay, high recruit selection standards, and 
training in scientific crime detection, in human relations, and in police 
administration.”114  To encourage such reforms, the Commission 
recommended federal “grants-in-aid” to state and local governments, 
enabling them to develop “selection tests and standards,” “training 
programs in constitutional rights and human relations,” and “college-level 
schools of police administration.”115  
  While the Civil Rights Commission advocated improvements in 
police training, state and local courts struggled with the challenge of how, 
precisely, to interpret Mapp.  “I cannot here even begin to develop all of 
the conflicting opinions that have been rendered by a variety of trial 
judges,” lamented District Attorney Richard Kuh one year after the 
decision.
116
  To take just a few examples, the Bronx County trial court or 
“Supreme Court” as it was called in New York, held in People v. Salerno 
that officers had probable cause to frisk a suspicious individual on the 
street based on the time of night he was sighted, the manner in which he 
was dressed, and the fact that he appeared to be carrying a weapon.
117
  
Meanwhile, the New York County Supreme Court held the opposite in 
People v. Rivera, a case where police stopped and “patted the outside” 
clothing of a suspect detected at 1:30 A.M. peering into the window of a 
bar and grill in a high crime neighborhood of Manhattan.
118
  According to 
the Court, police officers were authorized to stop but not frisk such 
suspects prior to arrest.
119
 
 Not long thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals outraged 
police when it overturned a policy conviction in which officers had made 
repeated sightings of individuals handing money to a suspect on the street, 
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searched the suspect, and found a list of numbers and cash.
120
  Though 
considered a “classic policy collector situation,” Romie Moore’s arrest 
struck the state’s highest appellate court as unlawful, particularly since 
“mere evidence of persons handing money to another person does not 
prove a crime.”121  Not only did police find such an observation absurd, 
but the court failed to answer the question whether an officer could search 
a defendant even if he did not have “conclusive proof” that a crime was 
being committed.
122
 
 By March of 1962, Governor Nelson Rockefeller joined police in 
declaring that “confusion” had become Mapp’s primary contribution to the 
law of search and arrest.
123
 To aid patrolmen on the street, Rockefeller 
endorsed a wave of measures aimed at improving working conditions, 
training, and pay for police, many of which echoed the Civil Rights 
Commission’s recommendations of 1961.124  To take just a few examples, 
the governor endorsed additional appropriations for state police so that 
they would not have to work more than forty hours a week.
125
  Rockefeller 
also announced a fifty percent increase in the number of required training 
hours for police, going from eighty to one hundred twenty; and 
recommended uniform standards “of age, education, and physical and 
character qualifications,” for all new recruits.126  For older police officers 
who “who never had formal training” he endorsed the creation of courses 
that paralleled the “mandatory basic course” required of entry-level 
police.
127
 
 Despite Rockefeller’s best hopes, police found calls for increased 
training to be on par with measures like the exclusionary rule, superficial 
checks that ignored the root causes of inequality.  According to New York 
Police Commissioner Vincent Broderick, large percentages of New York’s 
“Negro and Spanish-speaking” population were “being discriminated 
against in housing and forced to live in ghetto areas”128  Addressing such 
structural issues, argued Broderick, was more important than correcting 
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superficial matters of training or procedure.
129
  To his mind, the 
“devastating” poverty of the ghetto, including poor “education,” 
“housing,” and “employment,” were “the pressing issue[s] of our time.”130  
“Is it not time,” declared Broderick on February 8, 1966, “for us to stand 
up and say that we intend to deal with substance and not with shadow?”131  
Only the “marshalling of all of the resources of the State and Federal 
Governments,” continued Broderick, “could “help these, our fellow 
citizens.”132 
 In the absence of structural reform, police pushed for more limited 
gains; including a statute authorizing officers “to search and question a 
person” suspected of committing a crime “without making an arrest.”133  
An early reference to stop and frisks, the measure gained endorsements 
from the Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, a body made 
up of the State District Attorneys Association, the State Sheriffs 
Association, the Municipal Police Training Council and the State 
Association of Chiefs of Police.
134
  All four agencies hoped to carve out 
exceptions to Mapp via state legislation, a point they made clear in a 
pamphlet entitled Let your Police – Police! arguing that Mapp had 
“rendered good police work meaningless and police experience 
worthless.”135  To illustrate, the pamphlet cited the facts in People v. 
Cassone, a case involving a police officer who noticed two men “lugging 
a heavy object” into the trunk of a car, only to find that it was a Western 
Union safe.
136
  Unbelievably, the trial court held that the arrest was 
unlawful “because it was based on ‘mere suspicion’” not probable 
cause.
137
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 To remedy such problems, the NYPD joined the Combined 
Council and endorsed four bills that would “correct certain inequities” in 
the law of criminal procedure.
138
  Two of the four bills authorized officers 
to arrest suspects in cases where they had “reasonable grounds” for 
believing that a crime either was being committed or had just been 
completed.
139
  The third facilitated “the execution of warrants” where 
property risked being destroyed and the fourth authorized police to “stop, 
temporarily detain, question and search a person for weapons” where there 
was “reasonable ground” to suspect a crime.140 
 That the NYPD would push for a state law authorizing officers to 
stop and frisk suspects who appeared armed was not, on its face, a 
revolutionary move.  The genesis of formalizing stop and frisks had 
emerged as early as 1939, when the Interstate Commission on Crime 
appointed a committee to draft a model code governing the law of 
arrest.
141
  Prior to that point, a disorganized blend of common law and 
statute governed how police could handle suspicious persons on the 
street.
142
  Often, this left officers confused about whether stops were 
technically arrests or not, leading some to avoid questioning suspicious 
individuals for fear of “a suit for false arrest.”143  At other times, police 
extended stops to the point that they became unregulated detentions, or 
“imprisonment ex communicado” a phenomenon that the Uniform Arrest 
Act sought to contain by placing a two hour limitation on the time that 
police could detain someone.
144
   
 In addition to regulating stops, the Arrest Act also governed frisks, 
or searches, authorizing officers to search suspects if they had a reasonable 
fear that they were dangerous.
145
  By holding that a law enforcement 
officer could search someone whenever he had “reasonable ground to 
believe that he is in danger,” the Model Act settled one of the many 
questions raised by Mapp, namely whether officers could stop and search 
suspects without a warrant, and without having to lie and say that the 
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suspect had dropped contraband.  Rather than encourage corruption, in 
other words, the Act sought to reinforce “respect” for the law among 
police, meanwhile reducing the odds that suspects might feel “unjustly 
treated,” and less willing to “cooperate.”146 
 To its backers, the “stop and frisk” law reinforced the emerging 
image of the police officer as a professional and an “expert,” the very kind 
of individual that Governor Rockefeller sought to produce with higher 
standards, in-house training programs, and better hours.
147
  Further, the 
Council promoted the statute as a much needed safety measure for police, 
not just a tool for better, more effective law enforcement.  “Under present 
law,” declared the Council, stopping and frisking a subject would not only 
amount to an unlawful arrest, but could even invite suspects to use “as 
much force as necessary” to stop the officer in question, even harming 
them.
148
  Convinced that a stop and frisk law would improve police work 
conditions, the Combined Council also argued that it benefited those who 
were searched.  Recognizing that police might arrest individuals who they 
would otherwise only stop and frisk, the Council noted that “[w]henever 
an innocent person is arrested, charged with a crime, and brought before a 
magistrate, his reputation is harmed, he is humiliated, greatly 
inconvenienced and put to considerable expense.”149  Better that suspects 
simply get patted down on the side-walk and set free. 
 Not everyone agreed.  Black assemblymen objected to the stop and 
frisk legislation, arguing “that it would help create a ‘police state’ by 
subjecting the people of their districts to ‘even greater abuse than they 
now suffer at the hands of police.’”150  At the time, the “highest 
concentration” of arrests in New York occurred in predominantly black 
neighborhoods, most notably Harlem.
151
  Aware of such geographic 
concerns, black politicians argued that New York’s stop and frisk law 
would “allow policemen to ‘push around’ citizens and permit them to 
operate as ‘the Gestapo,’” precisely the type of totalitarianism that the 
Court had tried to address in Mapp.
152
  Yet, the terrain had shifted.  While 
Mapp created a zone of freedom within the home, it intensified police 
surveillance of the street, a move perfected by the normalization of stop 
and frisks.
153
  As the next section demonstrates, support for stop and frisk 
only intensified as urban unrest grew, creating a stark disconnect between 
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national narratives of expanding rights for criminal defendants and state 
sponsored policies of ghetto control. 
 
III. “TO CORRAL AND CONTROL THE GHETTO” 
 
 Black complaints about New York’s stop and frisk law 
underscored the complexity of police/minority relations in the city, a 
relationship that would only become more strained as the 1960s 
progressed.  For example, in June 1963 racial unrest exploded when over 
1,000 African Americans gathered to protest the arrest of a “Negro vendor 
of ices” in Harlem as officers “swinging nightsticks” quelled the crowd.154 
According to James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial 
Equality, or CORE, such violence threatened to “boil up in Harlems 
throughout the country” as black frustration over increased joblessness 
and “slum conditions” threatened “racial turmoil.”155 To avoid such 
turmoil, borough legislators met to “propose stronger laws curtailing job 
discrimination against Negroes and other minorities,” prompting city 
leaders to acknowledge the challenge that structural inequalities posed to 
black life.
156
 Yet, even as New York officials discoursed about long term 
goals like employment, housing, and education, so too did they recognize 
the short term necessity of keeping things calm.  According to New York 
City Mayor Robert F. Wagner “[c]onstructive changes” were taking place 
“in both the North and the South,” but this did not change the fact that 
police bore a particularly “difficult and delicate responsibility” to preserve 
“peace” and “order.”157   
 Precisely the kind of threat to order that Wagner alluded to 
emerged in New York in April 1963 when local chapters of CORE 
threatened to stall “hundreds of cars” on the highways leading to the 
World’s Fair in Queens, including the Grand Central Parkway, the 
Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, the Long Island Expressway and the Van 
Wyck.
158
  Not only did New York Mayor Robert Wagner declare such 
protest to be “illegal” but Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared it 
“irresponsible” and President Lyndon Johnson warned that the proposed 
demonstration risked “threats to safety,” even “violence.”159   
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Though CORE backed down, discord reemerged on July 9, 1963, 
when civil rights activists initiated a sit-in on the steps of Manhattan’s 
City Hall.
160
  Initially, Wagner allowed the demonstrators to “conduct 
their sit-in without hindrance,” declaring that he had “deep sympathy” for 
their effort to “focus public attention on the basic problem of civil 
rights.”161  However, the demonstrators quickly began to engage in 
activity that Wagner later characterized as “outright provocation,” 
including “outbursts of shouting, chanting, and littering” that created “an 
unjustifiable interference with the orderly operations of Government at its 
very seat and center.”162  On August 22, violence between the 
demonstrators and police erupted, resulting in the injury of three 
officers.
163
  Outraged, Mayor Wagner ordered the “immediate removal” of 
the protestors.
164
  To his mind, the fight to maintain order in the face of 
what was quickly becoming a “social revolution” taxed police in ways that 
the fight against “crime and evil” did not.165  Suddenly, law enforcement 
had to be versed not simply in “police tactics,” but also in “civil rights,” 
precisely so that they could better communicate with potential 
demonstrators, hopefully diffusing demonstrations without sparking 
violence.
166
  From this came a need for a “well-educated and 
professionally trained” force, one made up of what Wagner referred to as 
“professional soldiers.”167 
  That Wagner wished for professional police/soldiers versed in 
rights rhetoric underscored the manner in which police professionalism 
related to the successful management of political demonstrations and 
minority communities in New York.  If police were better educated and 
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better trained, Wagner implied, then they might be less prone to 
aggravating urban crowds, and less likely to incite riots – whether 
structural factors changed or not.
168
  Dramatic evidence of the link 
between police and riots emerged in the summer of 1964, when violence 
broke out in New York after a white police officer shot a fifteen year old 
black male in Harlem.
169
  During a demonstration protesting the boy’s 
death, “[t]housands” of African Americans “raced through the center of 
Harlem, attacking white persons, pulling fire alarms and looting stores.”170  
Violence continued for three days, eventually spreading to the Bedford 
Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn where a “full scale riot” exploded 
after CORE “staged another rally to protest the shooting of the Negro 
youth.”171 
 In an editorial commenting on the violence, black writer James 
Baldwin confirmed the relationship between police procedure and ghetto 
containment.  “There is a very good reason for the Negroes to hate the 
police in Harlem,” declared Baldwin, their “competence” was “abysmal” 
and “they know no other way of coping with the forces to which they are 
exposed” than to engage in “brutality.”172  Such brutality, continued 
Baldwin, formed a critical part of their efforts “to corral and control the 
citizens of the ghetto.”173  Baldwin’s accusation that the NYPD sought 
primarily to “corral” the ghetto coincided eerily with the police’s own 
complaints that judicial insistence on procedural reform simply obscured 
the unfair burden placed on police to maintain urban harmony, meanwhile 
ignoring the need for substantive political and economic change.
174
  Here, 
a prominent black voice corroborated police complaints, underscoring 
procedure’s role in preventing urban unrest.  
 That urban unrest threatened the nation became apparent to many 
during the early months of 1964 as metropolitan areas across the United 
States erupted in violence.
175
  In Jackson, Mississippi, for example, 
“hundreds of [black] students threw, rocks, bricks and bottles,” at 
“helmeted officers” after a white man struck a black coed with his 
automobile in February.
176
  Meanwhile in Chicago, “angry blacks” set 
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“fire” to a convenience store and proceeded to “rampage” for two nights 
after a white shopkeeper accused a black woman of “stealing a bottle of 
gin.”177  In Atlanta, upwards of 300 black protestors engaged in a 
“brawling sidewalk demonstration” against “[t]en robed Ku Klux 
Klansmen” who had entered a downtown Krystal’s restaurant.178  Among 
the demonstrators was John Lewis, chairman of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee, who allegedly “kicked and elbowed officers” as 
they placed him under arrest.
179
 
 The worst rioting stemmed directly from police action.  Not only 
did violence explode in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant after police shot a 
black teenager in July 1964, but rioting began north of the city in 
Rochester after “white police moved into a Negro neighborhood” to arrest 
a man “who had been creating a disturbance at a dance” that same 
month.
180
  Not long thereafter, rioting exploded for three consecutive 
nights in Paterson, New Jersey after police arrested “a Negro woman on a 
disorderly conduct charge.”181  Ninety miles south, in Philadelphia, the 
arrest of “a Negro woman whose car was blocking an intersection” led to 
“disorders” that lasted three nights in August as “[r]ioters broke store 
windows, looted shops, [and] hurled bricks from roofs at police.”182 
 The alarming spike in black violence caught the attention not only 
of average Americans but international audiences.  Soviet newspapers like 
Isvestiia and Pravda boasted headline coverage of American race riots, 
charging America for being a land of racial discrimination and political 
tyranny.
183
  Similarly, “leaders of African nations denounced the United 
States” for its perceived treatment of racial minorities, transforming 
America’s ghetto riots into a Cold War liability warranting quick, 
effective, state control.
184
   
Public embarrassment over riots spurred government officials 
across the country, including police, prosecutors, and judges to find ways 
of quelling the urban disorder.
185
  In Philadelphia, for example, officials 
deliberately curtailed a local tradition, the annual Mummer’s Parade, to 
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minimize rioting.
186
  Traditionally held on New Year’s Day, the parade 
featured upwards of “15,000 mummers” belonging to thirty-one different 
marching clubs, including “22 string band units, four fancy groups in 
satin-covered floats and huge capes and five brigades of comics.”187  The 
comics, in a manner that would prove explosive in 1964, often performed 
“in blackface,” a practice that roused white concern when city officials 
learned of “an active recruiting campaign being conducted in Harlem for 
persons to come here and protest.”188  Local CORE chairman Louis Smith 
warned that police should “look out for the rooftops because that is the 
way the people of New York operate,” implying that outside 
demonstrators would come to Philadelphia from New York and hurl 
missiles down onto paraders.
189
  Philadelphia’s “400 Negro ministers” 
concurred, warning that “rioting along the route of the parade” was likely 
to occur.
190
    
To prevent violence, local ministers filed suit in city court, arguing 
for an injunction banning anyone in blackface from participating in the 
march.
191
  During hearings before a three judge panel, police officials 
warned that “there might be ‘physical violence’” unless blackface 
marchers were “barred” from the parade.192  Though attorneys for the 
parade countered that “blackface” was “traditional” and that marchers 
“had no intention of belittling Negroes,” the three judges presiding over 
the case decided that a real threat of violence existed, warranting an end to 
the city’s blackface tradition.193 
As Philadelphia judges regulated Mummers, New York police 
focused on radical black leaders, among them William Epton, an activist 
arrested for conspiracy to riot and criminal anarchy in August 1964.
194
  
Epton’s conviction stemmed from the 1964 riots in Harlem, during which 
Epton publicly called for “organized resistance to the police and the 
destruction of the state.”195  Epton objected to his conviction, arguing that 
while he had been an outspoken critic of New York’s “paramilitary police 
force,” his primary concerns were structural, focused on the “inhumane 
conditions” of ghetto life, including the persistence of high “infant 
mortality rates,” “tuberculosis,” and “unemployment.”196   
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New York authorities showed little sympathy, positing that the 
black radical not only voiced interest in encouraging riots, but presented a 
clear and present danger to the state – a critical element in the charge of 
criminal anarchy.
197
  Not invoked since the prosecution of Communist 
Benjamin Gitlow in 1920, criminal anarchy seemed a poor fit for Epton, 
who at best appeared to represent a radical fringe of city politics.
198
  Yet, 
the very fact that Epton became the subject of criminal prosecution 
underscored at least two interconnected phenomena relating to criminal 
procedure and radical politics in New York at the time.
199
 
First, Epton’s conviction for criminal anarchy not only invoked 
memories of the persecution of communists like Benjamin Gitlow in the 
1920s, but pointed to persistent concerns with the kind of structural 
change that communists continued to endorse into the 1960s.  Like 
Gitlow, for example, Epton also identified with the communist cause, 
serving as the “vice chairman” of Harlem’s “Progressive Labor 
Movement,” a “Maoist” organization boasting upwards of 1,200 
members.
200
  Though not a union leader, to be sure, Epton’s concern with 
structural inequality paralleled police concerns with structural inequality; 
underscoring the fact that both police and advocates for the poor viewed 
procedural reforms simply as superficial salves to much deeper, structural 
wounds.   
Not only did Epton’s identification with radical labor point to 
police/poor parallels, but Epton’s conviction itself suggested a contested 
relationship between the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure rulings and 
civil rights.  When Mapp v. Ohio was decided in 1961, for example, many 
assumed that the Court’s criminal procedure rulings stemmed from an 
interest in civil rights, an interest articulated in rulings like Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954 and Cooper v. Aaron attacking massive 
resistance to civil rights in 1958.
201
  Yet, the Court’s zeal for such cases 
cooled in 1964 even as it blazed ahead with its regulation of police, 
indicating a disconnect between heightened social control and national 
narratives of expanding freedoms.
202
 
To illustrate, the Court’s early interest in protesters’ rights 
culminated in a series of rulings overturning the convictions of black 
demonstrators from 1961 to 1964.
203
  One such demonstrator, Janette 
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Hoston, entered a Kress Department store in Baton Rouge on March 29, 
1960 and proceeded to sit at a lunch counter reserved for whites.
204
  When 
Hoston refused a request to leave, local police arrested her for disturbing 
the peace.
205
  Though a relatively minor criminal charge, Hoston’s breach 
of the peace conviction nevertheless made it to the United States Supreme 
Court, who found the case “barren of any evidence that would support a 
finding that the petitioners’ conduct would even ‘foreseeably’ have 
disturbed the public.”206  The conclusion was dubious.  Sit-in 
demonstrations had in fact provoked violence and “fist fights between 
members of the two races” across the South, as the respondents argued in 
their brief, but the Court ignored such calamities in a bold statement of 
support for Hoston’s protest.207 
The Court continued its support for protest from 1961 to 1964, 
deciding upwards of twenty cases in favor of black demonstrators.
208
  In 
one of the last such cases, decided in 1964, the Court overturned another 
breach of the peace conviction, this time in Columbia, South Carolina.  In 
a case styled Barr v. City of Columbia, the Court reviewed the arrest of 
“five Negro college students” for breach of the peace, holding that their 
sit-in demonstration had been “quiet,” “peaceful,” and unlikely “to move 
onlookers to commit acts of violence.”209 Though opposing counsel 
disagreed, arguing that the demonstration had been “quite tense,” and that 
“everyone was on pins and needles … for fear that it could possibly lead 
to violence,” the Court once again downplayed any relationship between 
demonstrations and unrest.
210
 
Barr was the last protest case to hit the Court before the Harlem, 
Rochester, and Patterson riots that summer.  As pitched violence between 
urban blacks and white police intensified from June to August, the Court 
reevaluated its position on civil rights demonstrations generally, gradually 
moving against protesters in a batch of cases originating in the South, two 
of which involved protests in a church and one of which involved a 
demonstration in a school.
211
  In both, the Court denied certiorari, leaving 
the convictions intact without a pronouncement of law.
212
  Subsequent 
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refusals to grant cert followed, coupled with articulations of concern about 
black demonstrators in cases like Cox v. Louisiana in 1965.  There, the 
Court held that the exercise of free speech had to be tempered with the 
need for “maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be 
lost in the excesses of anarchy.”213  One year later, the Court upheld the 
conviction of thirty-two black college students who had gathered in protest 
at the Leon County jail in Tallahassee, Florida.
214
  Though the students 
were charged with malicious trespass, a conviction the Court had 
overturned in earlier cases like Bouie v. City of Columbia and Hamm v. 
City of Rock Hill, Justice Black held that the demonstrators no longer 
possessed the right to protest “wherever they please,” maintaining instead 
that local municipalities – “no less than a private owner of property” – 
retained the “power to preserve the property under its control for the use to 
which it is lawfully dedicated.”215  Subsequent anti-protest rulings 
followed; some clearly upholding convictions that would, according to 
civil rights lawyer Jack Greenberg “have been reversed” under the Court’s 
early, enthusiastic civil rights phase.
216
  By the close of 1967, the Supreme 
Court had so tired of civil rights that it even upheld the conviction of black 
civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. for violating an injunction not to 
march in Birmingham, Alabama four years earlier, noting that “[t]his 
Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore 
all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets.” 217   
Forgetting that the “battle in the streets” in Birmingham had in fact been 
one of the movement’s most significant victories, the Court sided instead 
with what King referred to as the “recalcitrant forces in the Deep South 
that will use the courts to perpetuate the unjust and illegal system of racial 
separation.”218 
As the Court curtailed southern streets, so too did it constrict urban 
landscapes in the North.  One year after upholding King’s conviction, for 
example, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of William Epton in 
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New York, again for violating an injunction not to march.
219
  Though 
Epton was ultimately charged with criminal anarchy, New York’s 
corporation counsel Leo Larkin had also acquired a “temporary 
injunction” banning black protest.220 As in Alabama, such injunctions 
proved a practical tool for containing black protest, one of the many “legal 
means” that New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller invoked “to maintain 
order in the state.”221  Though Epton and King differed in their rhetoric, 
King endorsing non-violence and Epton exhorting blacks to “smash” the 
state, both leaders fell victim to the same phenomenon: a growing 
consensus on the Court that black protest in public space needed to be 
contained.
222
  
 One possible explanation for the Court’s move against civil rights 
demonstrators just as the nation was celebrating civil rights gains may 
have been political.  While early civil rights demonstrations in the 
American South curried national sympathy for the black plight, later 
protests in the North and West sent tendrils of fear through the nation, 
causing many to fear large-scale disorder and unrest.
223
  As Supreme 
Court Justice Hugo Black put it in 1965, “the crowds that press in the 
streets for noble goals today can be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs 
pressuring the courts for precisely opposite ends.”224  Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall agreed, declaring that while it 
was “one thing” to demonstrate against unjust Jim Crow laws in the South, 
it was “another” to take the strategy of civil disobedience and apply it to 
the “complex and deep-rooted economic and social problems” plaguing 
minority communities in the urban north.
225
  Such an approach, Marshall 
warned, risked spreading both disrespect for law and an ensuing “crisis in 
law enforcement.”226 
 Of course, New York police had long claimed that precisely such a 
crisis was brewing, only growing more deadly as structural causes of 
inequality went unaddressed.
227
  However, the Court showed less interest 
in ameliorating structural inequality than it did in regulating face-to-face 
interactions on the street, both by sanctioning the use of injunctions 
against black demonstrators and, as urban unrest grew, continuing its 
campaign to reform police procedure.  For example, just as the Court 
began to uphold the convictions of black demonstrators in the South, so 
too did it impose even more stringent requirements on how police handled 
criminal suspects in the North, including a requirement that officers alert 
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defendants to their rights prior to questioning.
228
  Though liberals 
celebrated this move, consecrated in a decision styled Miranda v. Arizona, 
few squared it with the Court’s anti-protest cases, preferring instead to 
read the opinion as a victory for the poor.
229
  However, the Court’s 
demand that police inform suspects of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights promised little in the way of structural reform for poverty, sounding 
instead like an eerie parallel to calls for a “professional army” well-versed 
in rights rhetoric like the one endorsed by New York Mayor Robert 
Wagner in 1963.
230
  To Wagner, a more rights-savvy police promised a 
solution to urban discord, not an end to poverty, a matter that the Supreme 
Court did not address directly in its Miranda opinion, though the 
implications were clear once read beside its protest rulings.  For example, 
the Court’s decisions in Adderley, Walker, and Epton all indicate that the 
nation’s highest tribunal was becoming increasingly interested in 
corralling black anger, just as James Baldwin had warned in 1964.
231
  
 Though Miranda provided no guarantee that criminal defendants 
would actually have their rights upheld, its part in a larger drama of 
control was even more subtle, particularly as police departments 
themselves took cosmetic measures to improve the appearance of police 
action.  For example, the NYPD deliberately hired a black officer named 
Lloyd Sealy to head its Harlem precinct in 1964, a direct response to the 
riots there that summer.
232
  One month later, New York Police 
Commissioner Michael J. Murphy “warned” his men not to adopt a “rough 
manner” when interacting with civilians, particularly racial minorities, 
noting that harsh manners only bred “hatred and disrespect,” amounting to 
nothing less than “verbal brutality.”233  Not long thereafter, the 
Department organized a “two-day conclave” attended by chiefs of police 
from San Francisco, St. Louis, Boston, and Atlanta – a nod to a 
burgeoning North/South convergence – that aimed to “develop guidelines 
for police in their daily contacts with the public.”234  Among such 
guidelines was a need for police to “understand the problems,” and the 
“frustrations … of the people living in the communities they serve.”235  
Such attention to sensitivity dovetailed nicely with the Supreme Court’s 
requirement in 1966 that police respect the dignity of criminal suspects by 
publicly reading them their rights.
236
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 Yet, many patrolmen still felt mugged; particularly at decisions 
like Miranda that interfered with their ability to fight crime.
237
  To them, 
the ruling threatened the critical process of questioning suspects, a method 
central to the discovery of evidence.
238
  However, police officials like 
NYPD Commissioner Vincent Broderick took a broader view, explaining 
to officers that the police function had changed and that patrolmen were 
suddenly required to do “much more in the community than prevent 
crime.”239  According to Broderick, they were also required to protect the 
citizen’s right “to peaceful assembly and protest” meanwhile preserving a 
“climate of law and social order.”240  Just as some had predicted earlier, 
“crime-fighting” had gradually taken a back seat to “peace-keeping.”241 
 Though the new police function rankled some, preserving order did 
not always mean infringing on police discretion.  To illustrate, the 
Supreme Court lifted a significant burden from police in 1968 when it 
decided Terry v. Ohio, allowing officers to stop and frisk anyone 
suspected of actively committing a crime or possessing a weapon.
242
  In a 
related case styled Sibron v. New York, the Court held that New York 
police officers could rely on the Empire State’s “Stop and Frisk Law” so 
long as they possessed “reasonable suspicion” that individuals were either 
“engaged in criminal activity” or posed “a danger.”243  Though civil rights 
groups like the NAACP argued that the New York law should be 
invalidated because it promoted “uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
discretion by law enforcement officers,” the Court disagreed, a major 
victory for New York police unions.
244
  However, the Court did signal an 
interest in curbing the excesses generated by Mapp, particularly its 
disapproval of police tactics aimed at creating the illusion of dropped 
evidence, a move achieved by overturning the conviction of a suspect who 
police initially claimed “pulled out a tinfoil envelope and did attempt to 
throw same to the ground.”245  Further, the Court also acknowledged that 
“frisking” had indeed become “a severely exacerbating factor in police-
                                                 
237
 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW, & POLITICS (1983).  
238
 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW, & POLITICS (1983).  
239
 On Community Relations, SPRING 3100, Sept. 1965, at 1. 
240
 On Community Relations, SPRING 3100, Sept. 1965, at 1. 
241
 In June 1969, CUNY Sociology professor and former NYPD officer Arthur 
Niederhoffer posited that police had suddenly taken on two very different roles, “[c]rime 
prevention” and “peace-keeping” both of which were “antithetical.” The Changing City: 
Crime on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1969, 35. 
242
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Criminal procedure scholar David Harris shows 
how judicial interpretation of Terry has significantly expanded police discretion to stop 
and frisk suspects.  David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and 
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 665 (1994).   
243
 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60 (1968). 
244
 Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fun, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), 3. 
245
 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 46 (1968). 
  34 
community tensions,” a point underscoring the link between post-Mapp 
policing and urban riots.
246
 
 Though lamented by liberals, both Sibron and Terry continued 
efforts to normalize the streets in New York, marking the culmination of a 
much larger campaign to address urban inequality through strategies of 
riot-avoidance and containment.  As we have seen, such strategies did not 
involve structural reforms to ameliorate poverty so much as procedural 
rules aimed at scripting police/minority conduct.  Nor did such strategies 
impinge on the larger narrative of expanding rights that came with Mapp 
v. Ohio.  In fact, one year after the Supreme Court handed down Terry, it 
revisited a fact scenario uncannily similar to the one in Mapp but ruled 
directly on the obscenity question, allowing individuals to possess obscene 
materials in their homes; further expanding freedoms germane to domestic 
space.
247
  Even as urban minorities complained of heightened police 
surveillance on the street in other words, the Court continued to bolster a 
national narrative of expanding constitutional freedoms, albeit from within 
the private, interior confines of the home.   
  
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
Three months before the Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Terry v. Ohio, a commission appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to 
investigate the causes of urban riots in the United States issued a report, 
positing that the “abrasive” manner in which police handled ghetto 
residents posed a “a major – and explosive – source of grievance, tension, 
and disorder,” in the United States.248  Of particular concern to the Kerner 
Commission, as it was called, were the “tension-creating effects” of “stop-
and-frisk” searches, particularly those conducted at random with little eye 
to whether individuals were either armed or dangerous.
249
  Though the 
report did not mention Mapp v. Ohio, it corroborated the findings of New 
York Legal Services who had claimed five years earlier that the Supreme 
Court’s extension of the exclusionary rule to the states had worsened 
police conduct towards minorities.
250
  Terry, ironically, corrected for this, 
restricting police to only frisking individuals suspected of being armed or 
engaged in criminal activity.
251
 
That Terry might have benefited minorities by undoing Mapp’s 
negative effect on urban policing is generally not recognized by historians 
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of criminal procedure in the United States.
252
  Instead, Terry tends to be 
framed as a turn against the civil rights focus of Mapp, a coda to the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.253  Yet, recovering Terry’s 
role in correcting Mapp is important both for what it says about the 
exclusionary rule and for what it says about the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure revolution generally.  As this article has shown, the Court 
framed the exclusionary rule in Mapp in terms of intimate privacy rather 
than racial parity, a point that helps explain why the Court failed to 
anticipate its negative, urban effects.
254
  Second, as this article has also 
sought to demonstrate, both police unions and black activists lamented the 
Court’s move into procedure not as a liberal effort to help the poor so 
much as a deliberate attempt to sidestep the need for more extensive, 
structural reform.
255
  Some, like black writer and activist James Baldwin 
even accused the Court of simply trying to “corral and control” the 
“ghetto.”256    
Reframing the Court’s criminal procedure revolution as an effort to 
control the ghetto, though at first glance cynical, actually helps to establish 
two important points.  First, the Supreme Court’s curtailment of police 
behavior in opinions like Mapp v. Ohio did not help criminal defendants 
evenly, proving much more useful to defendants in private houses than 
public spaces.
257
  In fact, Mapp worsened police/minority conduct in such 
spaces, so much so that police themselves began to lobby for formalized 
stop and frisk rules.
258
  As the Supreme Court reviewed such rules, so too 
did it interiorize liberty, thwarting police invasions of the home 
meanwhile sanctioning heightened police surveillance of the street.
259
  
While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that 
stop and frisks contribute to the incarceration of minorities, she fails to 
account for the liberal/geographic forces that contributed to such a 
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result.
260
  Like many historians of criminal procedure, Alexander roots the 
rise of stop and frisk in a conservative backlash to the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure revolution, a backlash that extended through the War 
on Drugs.
261
  While this was certainly a factor, the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure revolution contributed to incarceration as well, first in 
the privacy frame that inspired Mapp v. Ohio, and later in efforts to curb 
police malfeasance in urban landscapes.
262
 That liberal reform joined 
conservative backlash in compartmentalizing liberty remains one of the 
least understood, but still important lessons to be learned from criminal 
procedure reform in the 1960s, a lesson demonstrating clearly how a 
narrative of expanding liberty could coincide with mass incarceration.   
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